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TEACHING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
DIFFERENTLY 
Philip C. Kissam* 
Another use of reason, much more creative and difficult, 
leads to an exercise of judgment. You provisionally accept alter-
native sets of premises, reasoning out of the consequences, and 
then exercise judgment to choose one set of premises over 
others .... 
Are we law teachers to be credited with teaching students 
how to do this kind of hard thinking about law? Even if we ac-
cept the inference that students are more skilled at this kind of 
thinking when they leave law school than when they entered, 
does it follow that our teaching caused this improvement? 
- Robert Keeton I 
In 1989 I completed a study of law school examinations.2 
Among other things, I concluded that the examination process 
tends to make law professors into boring and negative or excessively 
critical persons.3 In addition, I argued that the emphasis in law 
schools upon end-of-the-semester doctrinal examinations is anti-
educational in several ways. This process implicitly encourages 
professors to teach for the examination in the sense of "preparing 
students," or "setting them up," to write examination answers that 
can be graded easily to generate the multiple grade distinctions of 
contemporary law school grading curves and class ranking sys-
tems.4 Law school exams also encourage and reward narrow kinds 
of thinking and writing, and they diminish or preclude attention to 
thought and practice that concern more than the knowledge of doc-
trine (or given legal premises) and its application to particularized 
• Professor of Law, University of Kansas. Kent Bunting provided invaluable re-
search assistance and comments, and Peter Schanck gave his usual careful reading to a draft. 
I. Robert E. Keeton, Delivery of Justice as a Concern of Law Schools, 53 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 596, 600-01 (1978). 
2. Philip C. Kissam, Law School Examinations, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 433 (1989). 
3. See id. at 483-85. 
4. See id. at 444-52, 466-74. 
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situations.s To be sure, the law school examination system teaches 
basic forms of legal analysis, encourages acquisition of specialized 
doctrinal knowledge, prepares students to pass bar examinations, 
and sorts students for employers on some measure of relative pro-
ductivity. These functions, however, would not seem to require that 
each doctrinal course employ a problem-solving examination as the 
basic written work by students. In other words, even if our present 
system is appropriate on the whole, some of us should be able to 
(and should) employ different types of writing exercises to teach 
different aspects of legal work without abandoning the values of the 
system. Why not, for example, construct devices to implement 
Robert Keeton's suggestion that we help students learn to make 
judgments between alternative legal premises?6 
In 1989-90 I enjoyed the opportunity to spend a year as a visit-
ing fellow in our university's philosophy department. As both a 
student and teacher I discovered (or rediscovered) the joy and edu-
cational value that can be obtained from writing relatively short pa-
pers (say three, five, or eight pages) on complex and extensive 
subjects. I observed that the professors who assign such projects, in 
some cases to rather large classes, did not seem inordinately bur-
dened by their need to read, evaluate, and comment on these short 
papers. At the same time I discovered (or rediscovered) the joy and 
educational values that can be obtained from reading coherent if 
demanding texts by comparison to our law school readings of frag-
mented casebooks. Thus, somewhat accidentally, my experience 
with law school exams and the practices of other academic disci-
plines motivated me to think about new ways to teach doctrinal 
courses in law school. 
In 1990, upon returning to law teaching, my immediate chal-
lenge was to implement these principles of reading and writing in a 
four-credit required constitutional law course for upper-class stu-
dents. In reflecting on this problem, I was influenced not only by 
my past experience but also by the tradition in legal education, lim-
ited as it is, that emphasizes student-oriented learning by means of 
individual research and writing projects. 7 In this essay I shall de-
5. See id. at 440-44, 489-502. See generally Jeffrey W. Barnes, The Functions of As-
sessment: A Re-examination, 2 Legal Educ. Rev. 117 (1990-91). 
6. See Keeton, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 600-01 and accompanying text (cited in note I); 
Kissam, 42 Vand. L. Rev. at 500-01 (cited in note 2). Cf. Anthony D'Amato, Rethinking 
Legal Education, 74 Marq. L. Rev. 1, 35 (1990) ("law schools should stop teaching law. 
Instead, we should teach justice.") 
7. See Harry Pratter and Burton W. Kanter, Expanding the Tutorial Program: A 
Bloodless Revolution, 7 J. Legal Educ. 395 (1955); Howard C. Westwood, The Law Review 
Should Become the Law School, 31 Va. L. Rev. 913 (1945). This tradition has become more 
visible in recent years with the increasing number of law reviews and the expansion of writ-
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scribe the new course structure that I developed, and then offer jus-
tifications for the design and some comments on my experiences 
teaching with it. My purpose is to encourage others to experiment 
with similar course designs and to share ideas and assessments 
about such approaches. 
• • • 
In teaching constitutional law in the fall semesters of 1990 and 
1991, with 90 and then 120 students, I developed a course structure 
that is oriented towards individual learning and avoids the law 
school's traditional use of the case method and problem-solving fi-
nal examination to teach legal doctrine. This structure features in-
dividual research and writing projects by students, readings in 
Laurence Tribe's American Constitutional Laws as well as leading 
judicial opinions, lectures on constitutional doctrine, history, and 
theory, and discussion sessions that are organized around written 
statements and questions submitted by students. This design 
changes the learning and teaching process in important ways with-
out requiring much if any additional faculty time. 
The main innovation, which I have developed pragmatically 
over the past two years, has been the replacement of a final exami-
nation with a requirement that each student complete a "limited 
research, analytic paper" of eight double-spaced typed pages, which 
evaluates some significant premise choice in constitutional law. The 
premise choice to be evaluated is developed by each student from 
one of about thirty to forty approved topics. The "limited re-
search" aspect of the paper requires only that each student make 
"some use" of at least six relevant sources or authorities: a book or 
treatise other than Tribe's treatise, two law review articles, and 
three judicial decisions. I encourage students to evaluate their 
premise choice in constitutional law by writing a paper that is di-
vided, presumptively, into four parts: a short introduction of the 
premise choice to be evaluated, two sections of approximately three 
pages each that develop "the best possible constitutional argu-
ments" for alternative premises, and finally a page or so that 
presents reasons for choosing one premise over another.9 
In the fourth week of the semester I distribute a list of the ap-
ing-oriented seminars, especially at national law schools, but it remains a limited tradition in 
view of the continuing pervasive use of casebooks, the case method, and problem-solving final 
examinations in doctrinal law school courses. 
8. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Foundation, 2d ed. 1988). 
9. This structure is only a recommended one and can be changed if appropriate for a 
particular project. I also recommend that students consult published Supreme Court briefs in 
their leading cases but warn that such briefs are likely to be dated at best and not likely to be 
the source of the "best possible constitutional arguments" today about any given premise 
choice. See also Note A in the Appendix to this essay, which contains excerpts from my 
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proved topics on which students may choose to work. These lists 
have included such topics as "The Constitutionality of the War 
Powers Resolution of 1973," "Evaluating the Contemporary Dor-
mant Commerce Clause Doctrine," "Evaluating Commercial 
Speech Doctrine," "Evaluating Mozert v. Hawkins,"lo "Evaluating 
Griswold v. Connecticut," 11 and "Evaluating Post-Rodriquez State 
School Financing Cases."l2 Some topics include several premise 
choices ripe for evaluation while others suggest only one, but each 
topic presents at least one good opportunity to develop persuasive 
and relatively complex constitutional arguments about alternative 
premises, rules, or standards. 13 
By the end of the tenth week of the semester, each student 
must submit a three page "prospectus" that summarizes the sources 
or authorities that the student plans to use in her paper. I also in-
vite students to specify the premise choice they plan to evaluate and 
to use their prospectus to ask questions or report problems they are 
experiencing. I do not grade the prospectus, but I review each one 
to determine whether the minimum research requirement has been 
satisfied, to make suggestions about additional research that might 
be helpful and, if necessary, to help a student clarify an appropriate 
premise choice to evaluate. In effect, this review serves as an "on-
track filter" to help students focus on the process of assessing prem-
ise choices in constitutional law. I have been able to review and 
comment briefly on five or six prospectuses in about an hour, and 
thus I have returned these prospectuses about two weeks after their 
submission without much if any undue effort. 
The eight page paper is due at the end of the final exam period. 
I inform my students that I will grade their papers under the same 
standards I apply to seminar papers.l4 Thus, an "A" paper is one 
that deals with the complexities and contradictions of the topic in a 
relatively comprehensive and insightful manner. A "B+" paper 
would be an "A" paper but for a significant flaw or two. A "B" 
paper represents effective research, is well-organized and well-writ-
written guidelines for this project. I will gladly furnish a copy of the complete guidelines on 
request. 
10. Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (denying a 
free exercise of religion claim by a parent with religious objections to particular texts in a 
public school curriculum). 
II. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
12. In other words, evaluating the appropriateness of active judicial review of state pub-
lic school financing laws under state constitutional provisions despite the United States 
Supreme Court's unwillingness to do so under the Equal Protection Clause in San Antonio 
Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973). 
13. Note B in the Appendix contains my list of potential topics for the fall semester of 
1992 and some notes on previously employed topics as well. 
14. See Philip C. Kissam, Seminar Papers, 40 J. Legal Educ. 339, 346-47 (1990). 
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ten, and makes a reasonable attempt to develop and grapple with 
systematic arguments on both sides of the premise choice. A "C +" 
paper would be a B paper but for a few noted flaws or deficiencies, 
and a "C" paper is adequate in terms of its research and the coher-
ence of its writing or analysis. In effect, under these standards and 
our school's implicit grading curve that large courses should have 
an average grade of approximately "B," I have found that I assume 
the burden of justifying any grade below B and that the writer has 
an effective burden of persuading me that any grade above B is justi-
fied. I did not do this the first time, but at the end of the course in 
1991 I mailed to each student a brief note stating the grade on their 
paper and my reasons for the grade. As I have discovered in grad-
ing seminar papers, this kind of written evaluation helps me switch 
from the role of a "helping coach" to that of a "neutral umpire," 
and these explanations may also provide some constructive feed-
back to students. Is 
In addition to the limited research, analytic paper, I try to en-
courage students to acquire a broad initial knowledge of basic con-
stitutional doctrine by a mixture of methods and exhortation. Most 
significantly, I encourage them to read Tribe's treatise and the as-
signed judicial opinions carefully for three reasons: (1) to acquire 
background and experience in constitutional doctrine and analysis 
that will help them write effective papers, (2) as a good way to pre-
pare for bar examinations, and (3) as an effective means of familiar-
izing themselves with an important treatise that they may have an 
opportunity to use in practice. I also have distributed at the final 
class session two "take-home exam questions" that require short 
doctrinal answers (three or four typed pages in the aggregate) of the 
kind expected on traditional law school exams. The answers to 
these questions have been due on the last day of the exam period, 
and the grades on these papers have counted for a minor fraction of 
the course grade. I have doubts about how effective this "policing 
device" has been, and reading these answers has added a dispropor-
tionate amount of time to normal end-of-the-semester grading ef-
forts. I thus am planning to eliminate this device, or replace it with 
some more inventive and more cost-effective instrument (if such can 
15. See Philip C. Kissam, Thinking (By Writing) About Legal Writing, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 
135, 169 n. 96 ( 1987). Another device that might help this transition, of course, would be the 
"blind" or "anonymous" grading of these papers. I have hesitated to employ anonymous 
grading, however, because of the conferences I have with many students and because in some 
cases only one or two persons write on a topic. I thus fear that I would recognize some or 
even many of the authors of papers anyway and this could be unfair either to them or to 
others. 
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be found).t6 
This course structure necessarily affects what happens in the 
classroom. To date, I have divided each week's four class sessions 
into three categories, and this division seems to work relatively well 
in terms of attracting class attendance and, more importantly, in 
terms of supporting the many good papers that I have received from 
students in the past two years. The first two classes of each week 
are lectures on aspects of constitutional doctrine addressed by the 
assigned readings in Tribe or leading opinions. The third class is 
devoted to open-ended discussions with students about questions 
they have on the readings or lectures. For these sessions I have 
asked from six to eight students to give me, a few hours before class, 
a one page statement that summarizes "the most important as-
pects" of the week's readings and proposes a question "for class 
discussion." Typically I have tried to engage specific questioners in 
dialogues about their questions. These discussions have not always 
been scintillating, but this process does help me to ascertain roughly 
the levels of student understanding of the subjects under considera-
tion. Moreover, I have discovered that law students-with time to 
reflect-tend to ask very illuminating questions about the doctrines 
under study, and their written questions have enriched our discus-
sions of constitutional doctrine in ways that professorial-directed 
discussions simply do not. 
The fourth class of the week is devoted to subjects that I be-
lieve will assist or enrich the individual projects of the students. 
Early in the semester I talk about research and writing techniques 
and invite an expert from our library staff to talk about specific bib-
liographic aspects of constitutional research. I also spend two or 
three periods describing the approved research topics, and there-
after I offer lectures on constitutional history and the methods and 
theories of constitutional interpretation. These subjects appear to 
be of assistance to many students in writing about their premise 
choice in constitutional law. 11 
16. One possibility would be to employ a short answer final examination, but this could 
be unfair to students in terms of the time they spend on my course by comparison to other 
courses. Another possibility might be to require short essay answers to take-home questions 
and have the essays graded primarily by teaching assistants. This approach of course would 
have monetary costs and place some additional time costs on the faculty member. 
17. For arguments that more attention should be devoted to history and theory in 
teaching constitutional law, see David P. Bryden, Teaching Constitutional Law: Homage to 
Clio, I Const. Comm. 131 (1984); John D. Hyman, Constitutional Jurisprudence and the 
Teaching of Constitutional Law (reviewing Gerald Gunther, Cases and Materials on Constitu-
tional Law, 9th ed.), 28 Stan. L. Rev. 1271 (1976); William H. Rehnquist, A Comment on the 
Instruction of Constitutional Law, 14 Pepperdine L. Rev. 563 (1987). See also Daniel A. 
Farber and Suzanna Sherry, A History of the American Constitution (1990); John H. Garvey 
and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Modern Constitutional Theory: A Reader (West, 2d ed. 1991). 
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There are several justifications for employing some kind of 
"limited research, analytic paper" project instead of a final exam as 
the written work in doctrinal courses. First, the technique offers a 
different way for students to study and understand law, through 
individualized research and a sustained, reflective process of or-
ganizing and writing about a complex and contradictory subject. 
As I have argued elsewhere, the values of learning through this kind 
of research and writing process are undervalued in law schools by 
the primacy we give to heroic oral performances and the simulated 
oral advocacy of "writing" final exams under time constraints.ts 
The limited research analytic paper thus promises to provide benefi-
cial pedagogical diversity at relatively low costs. This project 
should benefit all students by requiring them to learn in a "quasi-
clinical" manner that involves their engagement in a sustained pro-
ject within which complex judgments must be made.t9 In addition, 
different students surely develop understandings of complex materi-
als in different ways, and this method of learning law may be espe-
cially beneficial to students who are disfavored or disinspirited by 
the law school examination process.2o 
The limited research, analytic paper project also seems to be a 
good systematic way of beginning to help students experience and 
develop their skills at evaluating and judging alternative legal prem-
ises. Even if the forms I use to define this project are overly schol-
arly or judicial in nature, the general process of assessing and 
choosing between alternative premises appears to be at the heart of 
many high quality legal practices.21 Here then is a low cost way to 
make legal education more practice-oriented without sacrificing the 
"theoretical" components of law school work that are involved in 
the study of legal doctrine. 
The limited research, analytic paper also appears to be a good 
method to help teach an open-ended, value-laden, dialectical subject 
such as constitutional law. The traditional examination system, 
with its emphasis on students acquiring or internalizing complex 
18. See Kissam, 40 Vand. L. Rev. at 141-51 (cited in note 15). 
19. Cf. Kissam, 40 I. of Legal Educ. 339 (cited in note 14) (arguing that writing semi-
nar papers on complex and contradictory issues is a valuable "quasi-clinical" form of legal 
education). 
20. Cf. Kissam, 42 Vand. L. Rev. at 489-90 (cited in note 2) (suggesting that norm 
referencing of law students by the law school examination process may disadvantage certain 
categories of students). 
21. See D'Amato, 74 Marq. L. Rev. I (cited in note 6); Keeton, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 596 
(cited in note I); Anthony T. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 835 (1987). 
See generally Donald A. Schon, Educating the Reflective Practitioner: Toward a New Design 
for Teaching and Learning in the Professions (Jossey-Bass, 1987); Donald A. Schon, The 
Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think In Action (Basic Books, 1983). 
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doctrine and skills at applying given premises to new situations, 
may be appropriate for teaching rule-dominated legal subjects.22 In 
a subject like constitutional law, however, the analytical methods 
are quite similar from doctrine to doctrine and any full understand-
ing of the analysis and principles or arguments that underlie the 
doctrine requires complex readings, discussions, much patience, 
and time. In this situation, a requirement that students try to 
master one particular doctrinal puzzle rather than survey many 
seems to make good sense. Final exams on constitutional doctrine 
may teach many students superficial thinking by comparison to a 
sustained even if limited research and writing project.B 
Finally, the limited research, analytic paper assignment may 
also be justified as a type of "advanced legal research" project. In 
recent years there have been many complaints about the quality of 
research skills acquired in law schools.24 A number of schools have 
established "advanced research" courses in response to these com-
plaints and various demands for more research training,2s and in-
deed some argue that legal research and writing skills are best 
acquired in upper-class courses after students have developed some 
familiarity with doctrinal analysis.26 To be sure, I do not press my 
students very hard or evaluate them on the comprehensiveness or 
exhaustiveness of their research for these writing projects. On the 
other hand, both my sense of student efforts and anecdotal evidence 
suggest that many students engage in extensive research before se-
lecting their topic and the relevant sources for their paper. In any 
event, this project allows our library staff and me to remind many 
students about some of the basic research lessons they first exper-
ienced in their first-year research and writing course. The project 
also forces students to think at various points about the availability 
of specific constitutional research materials. At least symbolically, 
the limited research, analytic paper project promotes education in 
legal research skills. 
22. See Kissam, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 433 (cited in note 2). 
23. See id. See also Note C in the Appendix which summarizes the qualities of the 
different kinds of papers I received in the fall of 1991. Cf. J.B. Biggs, Teaching for Better 
Learning, 2 Legal Educ. Rev. 133 (1990-91) (advising law teachers to establish "motivational 
contexts" that encourage students to engage in "deep" rather than "surface" learning). 
24. Compare I. Trotter Hardy, Why Legal Research Training is So Bad: A Response to 
Howland and Lewis, 41 J. Legal Educ. 221 (1991), with Joan S. Howland and Nancy J. 
Lewis, The Effectiveness of Law School Legal Research Training Programs, 40 J. Legal Educ. 
381 (1990), and Thomas A. Woxland, Why Can't Johnny Research? or It All Started With 
Christopher Columbus Langdel/, 81 L. Library J. 451 (1989). 
25. See S. Blair Kauffman, Advanced Legal Research Courses: A New Trend in Ameri· 
can Legal Education, 6 Legal Ref. Serv. Q. 123 (Fall/Winter 1986). 
26. See Robert C. Berring and Kathleen Vanden Heuvel, Legal Research: Should Stu-
dents Learn It or Wing It?, 81 L. Library J. 431 (1989). 
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The use of a treatise in place of a casebook for most reading 
assignments is certainly not innovative.27 Moreover, I am not sure 
whether the limited research, analytic paper project is better accom-
panied by reading assignments in a treatise or a casebook. 
Although fragmented in nature, the excerpts of judicial opinions in 
casebooks do provide the helpful concreteness of specific stories and 
many possibilities for the direct study of the dialectical process of 
constitutional argument about alternative premises.2s Nevertheless, 
I suspect that in an upper-class course many students are en-
couraged to do the readings and thus obtain an effective introduc-
tion to constitutional doctrine by arguments that reading a treatise 
is a good way to prepare for bar examinations and that acquiring 
familiarity with Tribe's treatise may have advantages in practice.29 
In addition, the use of a treatise provides a broad doctrinal 
context by comparison to casebook readings within which to ana-
lyze particular cases and arguments of constitutional law. Tribe's 
treatise also provides students with many insightful discussions of 
the dialectical qualities of constitutional argument, and thus 
promises to help each student's own dialectical work with a premise 
choice in her limited research, analytic paper. Furthermore, as Jay 
Feinman and Mark Feldman discovered in developing their course 
combining contracts, torts, and legal research, the employment of 
treatise-like readings accompanied by reiterative lectures on doc-
trine can teach "black letter law" efficiently and thereby provide 
more time both in and outside the classroom for studying and learn-
ing analytical skills.Jo 
Lecturing is certainly not innovative either. But this form of 
education, notwithstanding its drawbacks, seems a helpful if not a 
necessary accompaniment to the analytic paper project and treatise 
readings. Twice-weekly lectures on constitutional doctrine provide 
reiteration and elaboration of main points in the readings or, for 
those who may not read, an alternative format from which to ac-
quire an introduction to the vocabulary and grammar of constitu-
27. See, e.g., Walter Gellhorn, The Second and Third Years of Law Study, 17 J. Legal 
Educ. I (1964) (recommending use of treatise-like readings to "cover" legal doctrine in upper 
class courses). 
28. The possible advantages of the case method of legal instruction are well summa-
rized by Paul D. Carrington, Book Review, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 477, 490-92 (1984) (reviewing 
Robert P. Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s 
(1983)). 
29. See text following note 15. My favorite comment that supports this point, albeit 
from a nontraditional student, was: "It's amazing what you can learn when you're not re-
sponsible for the reading." 
30. See Jay M. Feinman and Marc Feldman, Achieving Excellence: Mastery Learning 
in Legal Education, 35 J. Legal Educ. 528 (1985). 
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tional law. I also have a strong sense (and evidence from reading 
the papers) that the limited research, analytic paper project causes 
many students to take seriously questions about constitutional the-
ory, interpretation, and method. Some students undoubtedly ac-
quire this interest and seriousness from their study of particular 
issues or the requirement that they use secondary sources as well as 
cases in writing their papers. Others seem to benefit from the lec-
tures on constitutional history and the theory and methods of con-
stitutional interpretation, which constitute a major part of the 
lectures designed to aid writing projects directly. Whatever the 
causes or motivations, this seriousness about history and theory has 
been an important difference between teaching with this course de-
sign and my prior decade of teaching constitutional law with 
casebooks, the case method, and traditional problem-solving final 
examinations. 
Student-oriented discussion sessions based on statements and 
questions submitted in advance seem like a good device to enhance 
both lectures and readings. One page statements summarizing "the 
most important aspects" of a week's readings, if taken seriously, 
appear to focus students on the more important and more difficult 
aspects of constitutional law. The statements also provide a useful 
review process. In fact, I encourage students who ask "how to out-
line" treatise readings to engage in this process on a weekly basis in 
order to obtain the review advantages that good outlining can pro-
vide for the purpose of exam preparation. Furthermore, many of 
these student questions help illuminate the doctrines under study in 
several ways: by asking for clarification of difficult points, by asking 
how a doctrine might be applied to particular cases or hypothetical 
problems, and by raising insightful evaluative questions. 
There are, of course, some inevitable trade-offs in teaching with 
this design, and each trade-off may be viewed as an objection to the 
design. I have answers to these objections that mitigate them sub-
stantially, but any objections about trade-offs from conventional 
practices are certainly stubborn ones in our law school world and 
these complaints may not disappear easily. 
Under this design there is less immediate incentive for students 
to study doctrine broadly and thus acquire the doctrinal knowledge 
that we believe necessary to pass bar exams and perhaps for practice 
as well. My answer to this objection is one of ethics or educational 
philosophy, although this view will not be shared by everyone. My 
responsibility is to provide opportunities or structures for law stu-
dents to acquire this doctrinal knowledge, but I do not have a re-
sponsibility to police them in this process. Responsibility for 
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acquiring doctrinal knowledge rests with each individual student.J• 
The absence of a comprehensive, issue-spotting final exam also 
means that students obtain less training, to some undetermined ex-
tent, in identifying constitutional issues and-importantly-in ap-
plying the given premises or rules of constitutional law to complex 
fact situations. This loss worries me at times, especially because 
there are intellectual as well as legal values in acquiring familiarity 
with the "means-ends" analysis that pervades so much of constitu-
tional law. My answer to this objection is only a mitigating one. I 
wonder whether our final examination system teaches very much in 
the way of issue identification and rule application skills, or whether 
law school examinations are not instead mostly devices to evaluate 
our students' natural problem-solving skills for the purposes of em-
ployer screening.32 It seems to me that our final examination sys-
tem is likely to teach issue identification and rule application skills 
effectively and broadly, to most students that is, only if final exami-
nations are preceded by much genuine practice and supervised feed-
back to students.33 This simply is not done very much in law 
schools. Still, there is undoubtedly some loss in a valuable kind of 
skills training from substituting a limited research, analytic paper 
for a traditional final examination. I believe, though, that this loss 
is not a very substantial one. 
Finally, the necessary use of qualitative grading standards un-
doubtedly produces fewer grade distinctions than can be achieved 
by grading classic issue-spotting final examinations on a numerical 
or quantitative basis.34 Under qualitative standards I award more B 
grades and fewer higher or lower grades than is typical at our 
school. This may be of concern to students and faculty who believe 
that many diverse grades are somehow "natural" or "appropriate," 
or to those who believe more pragmatically that discrete class ranks 
encourage prospective employers to hire graduates of one's school. 
My answer to this objection is threefold. A grading system should 
fit the kind of examination work that is demanded of students, and 
31. Cf. James Boyd White, Doctrine in a Vacuum: Reflections on What a Law School 
Ought (and Ought Not) to Be, 36 J. Legal Educ. 155, 164 (1986) ("The first assumption that 
should go is that everything of importance in the field, or for the exam, will be covered in 
class. We should feel free to treat our students as grown-ups, able to read and think on their 
own.") Why are we not able to rid ourselves of this fundamental assumption? 
32. See Kissam, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 433 (cited in note 2). 
33. See Feinman and Feldman, 35 J. Legal Educ. 528 (cited in note 30); Janet Motley, 
A Foolish Consistency: The Law School Exam, 10 Nova L. J. 723 (1986). 
34. Cf. Kissam, 42 Vand. L. Rev. at 444-52 (cited in note 2) (comparing an "Aristote-
lian" grading approach, in which qualitative standards are applied to student writing, with a 
quantitative or "objective" approach that is encouraged if not required by law school grading 
curves that demand multiple grading distinctions). 
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qualitative grading standards seem like the only reasonable stan-
dards to evaluate the construction of constitutional arguments 
about a choice of premises. Law schools also might be more hu-
mane places if fewer grading distinctions were employed. In any 
event, as long as the bulk of law school courses generate multiple 
grade distinctions, this should be sufficient to construct the kind of 
class ranking system that employers are believed to rely upon. 
Within this system some doctrinal courses might employ less indi-
viduated grading, or take a "free ride" as it were, without upsetting 
the overall values of class ranking. 
I wish to move now from reasons that justify this course design 
to some personal observations about its potential values and dys-
functions. I shall discuss first the values or pleasures I have discov-
ered in both the process and the products of this kind of teaching 
and then tum to some apparent disadvantages of the design as a 
matter of my own experience. 
The more unexpected pleasures from this course design have 
been several sorts of process values. I have always tried to achieve 
an open personal style, but few of my students have wanted to dis-
cuss legal or educational issues on an individual basis, which I had 
always assumed was the essence of good education. Perhaps my 
classroom style is too forbidding, or perhaps my subjects are too 
open-ended or theoretical for students to care. In any event this 
situation has changed dramatically with use of the limited research, 
analytic paper projects. Many students of their own accord, and 
many others invited by comments on their prospectuses, have now 
discovered the location of my office. Significantly, they come well-
prepared with thoughtful questions about their projects, and their 
background understandings make exciting, probing discussions of 
constitutional subjects possible. Some students need more help than 
others, but each conference is different and in these conversations 
there is rarely the repetitiveness or boredom of the mundane that I 
understand (more by rumor than by experience) is frequent when 
faculty-student discussions take place about a student's prospective 
final examination. 
A second process value, more observed than experienced, has 
been the obvious joy or excitement that many students profess or 
manifest while working on their analytic projects. Most signifi-
cantly, it seems that these projects and the opportunity of each stu-
dent to choose from among twenty or thirty different topics allows 
many (perhaps most) students not only to pursue their own special 
interests in law and justice but also to exercise their distinctive 
voices-at least in the part of the project that invites them to choose 
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and give reasons for choosing constitutional premises. In a small 
way, this limited research, analytic paper project promotes the edu-
cational theories of feminists and critical race theorists that legal 
education would be more effective and humanistic by allowing for 
and encouraging greater expression of the distinct experiences and 
perspectives of women and minority law students.Js 
The third and least expected process value has been the liberat-
ing if frustrating experience of changing my classroom style in mid-
career so to speak. I have qualms about the values of classroom 
lecturing, both in general and in regard to my own capacity. I have 
experienced much classroom boredom, both as a listener to others 
and as a listener to my own doctrine-oriented lectures. Theater ma-
jors have noticed that my voice can lapse into a dreadful monotone, 
and I am drawn toward abstraction and theory in ways that often 
seem to lose many if not most listeners. Nonetheless, the opportu-
nity to lecture on the basis of a coherent text like Tribe's and to 
lecture directly on history and theory in constitutional law has con-
stituted an exciting change from old case-method habits. It will 
probably take years of practice and many reformations before I feel 
even moderately comfortable about lecturing, but I can recommend 
this change as a useful tonic and as a means of recommitment to our 
basic obligation to teach as best we can. 
The major pleasure, not unexpectedly, has been reading the 
final papers of my students. There is simply no comparison (or, I 
should say, no adequate way to express the differences) between 
reading 120 relatively coherent, well-written papers on twenty or 
thirty different open-ended topics in constitutional law and reading 
120 blue book answers to the same set of problems. Reading papers 
engages me as an interested, sympathetic interpreter of student 
writing by comparison to the dreary negativism of reading blue 
books simply to sort them into different grading categories.36 
Moreover, this new reading frequently if not typically provides me 
with new ideas about constitutional subjects, either directly from a 
student's paper or indirectly from my own musings about the text 
before me. Most importantly, this evaluation process provides me 
with evidence that the vast majority of our students are competent 
and talented writers and thinkers about complex legal subjects. 
This, I think, is a significant difference from the negative impres-
35. See, e.g., Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious 
Pedagogy in Legal Education, II Nat!. Black L. J. I (1989); Carrie Menkei-Meadow, Ex-
cluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making New Voices in the Law, 42 Miami 
L. Rev. 29 (1987); Catherine Weiss and Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty 
Women, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1299 (1988). 
36. See Kissam, 42 Vand. L. Rev. at 445-47 (cited in note 2). 
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sions of most students' intellectual and lawyerly abilities that tend 
to be generated in professorial minds by reading typical law school 
blue books.37 In any event, this experience has changed my views 
about the talents of our students in general. This experience also 
provides me with evidence to make relatively concrete and positive 
recommendations to prospective employers-no matter what a stu-
dent's grade point average or class rank may be.Js 
There have been discomforts as well. I have noted my qualms 
about lecturing, and I have similar concerns about the quality of the 
discussion classes based on submitted statements and questions. 
The statements and questions for the most part have been well 
done, but can any discussion of relatively unconstrained and open-
ended questions in a large classroom ever constitute effective educa-
tion for most students? Even after years of practice and experience 
with this process, could one ever expect to measure the learning 
effectiveness of these sessions in a meaningful way? There is, of 
course, the record of student contents and discontents expressed on 
their teaching evaluations, but does anyone think that this record is 
an accurate or comprehensive measure of educational quality?J9 
My current plan is to continue experimenting with this idea and to 
search for adjustments that might encourage better or more robust 
dialogues in large law school classes. 40 
Another discomfort concerns the increased opportunities for 
"cheating" on limited research, analytic papers by plagiarism, by 
copying from or modeling papers on other student papers, or by the 
37. See Jay Feinman and Marc Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 Georgetown L. J. 
875, 879-82 (1985); Motley, 10 Nova L. J. at 723-24 (cited in note 33). 
38. At the beginning of the semester I mention the possibility of recommendations 
based on my evaluation letters, which even for C+ or C grades may contain many positive 
observations about a particular paper. 
39. For reasons why we should not think this, see Richard L. Abel, Evaluating Evalua-
tions: How Should Law Schools Judge Teaching?, 40 J. Legal Educ. 407 (1990); Philip C. 
Kissam, The Decline of Law School Professionalism, 134 U. Penn. L. Rev. 251, 272-75 (1986); 
Marin Roger Scordato, The Dualist Model of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 40 Am. U. L. 
Rev. 367, 406-410 (1990); Paul Ramsden, Evaluating and Improving Teaching in Higher Ed-
ucation, 2 Legal Educ. Rev. 149, 160-165 (1990-91). Of course, faculty members who obtain 
the highest marks on student evaluations are likely to think that these evaluations are worth· 
while measures (how could they not think this?). And law school deans who must evaluate 
the teaching quality of faculty differentially and have only student evaluations with which to 
work probably believe that their "readings" of the evaluations generate worthwhile measures 
of quality. But see Kissam, supra. 
40. On the basis of decidedly mixed student evaluations with many students disliking 
the discussion sessions and others asking for more discussion, I am contemplating experi-
menting with a new procedure. I would offer a "black letter law" lecture the first day of the 
week, in part to assist students in reading Tribe's treatise. On the second and third days, with 
students submitting statements that outline arguments on both sides of a controversial issue 
identified in the day's readings, I would provide "lecture/discussion" sessions aimed at devel-
oping the best possible arguments on these issues. 
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employment of substitute writers. Besides careful readings of the 
papers, I rely on two devices that should mitigate this problem. I 
change the approved topics list from year-to-year and eliminate 
more popular topics from prior years, thus reducing the possibility 
of copying from papers that are "still in the building" as it were. 
Perhaps more importantly, the statements and questions submitted 
for class discussions provide some evidence of each student's in-
dependent writing and thinking abilities, and this evidence can serve 
as a check against later submissions of papers that might have been 
plagiarized, copied, or written by a substitute.4I Moreover, we have 
the mechanisms of honor codes and pressure from one's competitive 
peers to help guard against such cheating. 
The most significant discomforts I have experienced concern 
what I call the subjective downsides of my role as an evaluator of 
the limited research, analytic papers. My concerns are not with ap-
plying qualitative standards, or with the minimal extra effort that is 
entailed in writing short notes to explain my application of these 
standards. Such judgments and feedback may be more complex, 
difficult, or time-consuming than "objective" grading of final exami-
nations, but these kinds of judgment and feedback to students are 
implicated in our obligation to teach each of our students as best we 
can. Nor are my concerns about possible fears or perceptions that a 
non-anonymous grading process may be administered unfairly. To 
assuage this fear (among students or myself), I keep before me two 
analogies: law firm partners evaluating the written work of associ-
ates for the purpose of salary or partnership decisions, and judges 
evaluating the briefs of opposing counsel. My concerns instead are 
with two more diffuse aspects of the complex "power/knowledge 
relations" that exist among law faculty and students.42 
First, my ethical obligation to evaluate the limited research, 
analytic papers under our school's implicit grading curve of an 
overall B average for large classes is bothersome at times. The lim-
ited research, analytic paper projects often engage me as a coach (or 
limited partner) in trying to help students think through and write 
about complex, difficult and intriguing projects in the best possible 
way. There is then, inevitably, something of myself in many final 
papers. More importantly, most papers in the past two years have 
presented convincing evidence of a very substantial research effort, 
thoughtful analysis, and clear writing about complex and contradic-
41. See Kissam, 40 Vand. L. Rev. at 160-61 (cited in note 15). 
42. On the nature of power/knowledge relations that arise in modern professional insti-
tutions and make possible much professional knowledge and power, see Michel Foucault, 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings /972-1977 (Colin Gordon tr., Pan-
theon, 1980). 
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tory constitutional arguments. Yet at grading time I am con-
strained by our school's implicit grading curve to award only a few 
A orB+ grades and to give mostly Bs or C+s in order to generate 
an average grade that approximates those in other courses. Fair-
ness in grading among different courses and among different sec-
tions of the same course, a concept to which I am attached, 
competes here seriously and anxiously with the idea of fairness in 
appropriately evaluating good individual work, a concept to which I 
am also attached. I have no easy answer for this discomfort, 
although perhaps additional experience will either increase or dissi-
pate the tension between these two very different conceptions of 
grading fairness. 
Second, the analytic paper project transforms the presence and 
exercise of power by a faculty member over his students in some 
interesting and potentially troubling ways. Students no longer have 
the same incentives to "read" the nuances of professorial discus-
sions in the classroom as indications of possible questions or best 
answers on final examinations, but they have new incentives and 
opportunities to seek guidance from me in how to write a paper for 
the best possible grade. In general these incentives and opportuni-
ties improve the educational process for reasons I have suggested 
earlier. However, each year a number of students appear to be con-
genitally confused or uncertain about how to proceed with any 
"next step" in constructing their papers, and they seem to spend 
inordinate amounts of time in my office worrying about their next 
steps. Other students appear to be more deliberately focused upon 
trying to elicit some prior sign from me that if they write such and 
such it will be an A orB paper.43 
These attitudes of confusion or solicitation can lead to prob-
lematic conversations, although I have been learning to treat these 
situations by employing another partner-associate analogy. I re-
mind myself, and my students as appropriate, that the limited re-
search, analytic paper project is training for a professional practice 
in which they will be expected to ask useful and relevant questions 
of senior lawyers for guidance but not for the purposes of obtaining 
either detailed instruction manuals or preliminary evaluations of 
the quality of their work. This then is training in a kind of profes-
43. Kent Bunting has suggested to me that these students, especially the former group, 
may be disoriented by a sense that the limited research, analytic paper involves "originality" 
instead of the "imitation process" that they are familiar with from examination experiences, 
even those of law school. This project does involve a different kind of imitation, that of 
modeling arguments from constitutional arguments that have been made by others, and I 
hope in the future to be able to explain this difference between different kinds of imitation 
more clearly to my students than I have in the past. 
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sional uncertainty. I am not sure how my students understand this 
analogy, but it seems to me an instructive one. I intend to employ 
this analogy more frequently, both to encourage uncertain students 
and to discourage those who only want to "read" me for the pur-
poses of obtaining a certain grade. 
There are then some disadvantages and discomforts from 
teaching constitutional law differently. These disadvantages pale, I 
think, in view of this design's considerable advantages. I recom-
mend that we experiment with and share ideas about teaching con-
stitutional law (and other doctrines too) by means of student-
oriented research and writing projects. 
APPENDIX 
Note A 
Guidelines for Limited Research, Analytic Papers 
The following passages are excerpts from the "writing guide-
lines" that I distribute at the beginning of the semester. I can send 
a copy of the guidelines to anyone who asks. 
Objectives 
A primary objective for law school writing projects should be 
to conduct research and write a well organized paper on a topic that 
involves some kind of complexity (there are different levels) and 
some kind of contradiction (there are several kinds). My goal is to 
help each of you develop and complete a research and writing pro-
ject that deals successfully with complexity and contradiction. 
The Bibliographic Essay or Prospectus 
A bibliographic essay is an essay, not a bibliography! This es-
say should be three (3) typed double-spaced pages that report on 
your research to date. This report should include (1) a statement of 
the question or questions you propose to ask and resolve, and (2) a 
summary of the major works (cases and secondary literature) you 
have read, with brief informal citations to these works. The report 
may also indicate open or difficult questions raised by these materi-
als, further research to be done, and other short or tangentially rele-
vant materials you have studied. You may attach a bibliography 
but please do not substitute a bibliography for the essay. 
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The Strong Introduction 
Your paper must have what I call a strong introduction; a 
strong introduction should include: 
1. a statement of the purpose, the main point, or focus of the 
memorandum; in other words, a specific statement of the ques-
tion you propose to address; 
2. a statement of the major parts of your memo, which indicates 
adequately the relationships between these parts or, in other 
words, the organizing principle behind your paper; 
3. a statement of your major conclusions, findings, or thesis-a 
partner in my former law firm once told me, "Flip, lawyers 
don't write mystery stories;" in other words, this strong intro-
duction should help focus both your attention and your reader's 
attention by providing a context and standards of relevance that 
will help both to write and to read the paper; 
4. for an eight page paper, this strong introduction probably 
should be limited to a short paragraph of three or four 
sentences! 
Let me be clear about this requirement. A strong introduction 
is not "the truth" about expository writing; it is not the only cor-
rect way to write. It is, however, a helpful technique for organizing 
one's thoughts about complex subjects, and you should try this 
technique at least this one time. 
Some Advice on Form 
All writing should have good form. What good form is un-
doubtedly varies from genre to genre, subject to subject, writer to 
writer, and reader to reader, but I think that one uncontestable defi-
nition of good form is the following idea from Kenneth Burke: 
'Form in literature is an arousing and fulfillment of desires. A 
work has form in so far as one part of it leads a reader to anticipate 
another part, to be gratified by the sequence.' Kenneth Burke, 
Counter-Statement 124 (1929). 
Note B 
Potential Topics for 1992 
I. Separation of Powers Issues 
A. Evaluating the Power of Judicial Review 
1. Was Marbury v. Madison decided correctly? 
2. Framers' Intent Theory: An Evaluation 
3. Originalism versus Nonoriginalism? 
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4. Do We Have a Formulaic Constitution? 
5. Should Judicial Review Be Provisional? 
6. Tribe's Model of Structural Justice (see ch. 17) -
A Critical Evaluation 
B. Evaluating Curtiss- Wright Export Co. 
C. Evaluating Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
D. Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution of 
1973 
II. Federalism Issues 
A. Federal Power, State Power, and American Indians 
1. Evaluating Mcintosh v. Johnson (1821) 
2. Evaluating the Cherokee Indian Cases (1830s) 
B. The New Deal Revolution: Should the Supreme Court 
have withdrawn from review of Congress' powers to 
regulate? 
C. The "Dormant Commerce Clause" Doctrine: An 
Evaluation 
D. Judicial Review of State Highway Regulations: An 
Evaluation 
E. The "Market Participant" Exception to the Dormant 
Commerce Clause Doctrine: An Evaluation 
III. Contracts Clause Doctrine 
A. Evaluating Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell 
B. Evaluating Allied Structural Steel and its Progeny 
IV. Privileges and Immunities Doctrine: An Evaluation 
V. First Amendment Issues 
A. State Regulation of Religious Schooling 
B. Religious Beliefs and Enforced Medical Care 
C. Should Political Speech Be Privileged? 
D. Should Subversive Speech Be Protected? 
E. Campaign Financing and the First Amendment 
F. Should Corporations Have Speech Rights? 
G. Regulating Racist Speech-A First Amendment 
Dilemma? 
H. Regulating Pornography Beyond Obscenity? 
I. Evaluating Employment Div., Human Resources v. 
Smith 
VI. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Issues 
A. Administrative Due Process: Goldberg v. Kelly, Roth, 
and their Aftermath: Evaluating the "New Property" 
B. Substantive Due Process, 1868 to 1937: An 
Evaluation 
256 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 9:237 
C. Substantive Economic Due Process Doctrine under 
State Constitutions: An Evaluation 
D. Privacy Doctrine, Law & Theory: 
1. Evaluating Skinner v. Oklahoma 
2. Evaluating Griswold v. Connecticut 
3. A Feminist Analysis of Privacy Doctrine 
VII. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Issues 
A. Congress' Powers Under the 14th Amendment? May 
Congress Override or Modify Judicial Interpretations? 
B. Gender Discrimination Law & Theory: An Evaluation 
C. Regulation of Aliens and Equal Protection Law 
D. State Constitutional Law and Public School 
Financing: Equal Protection Law after Rodriguez (e.g. 
NJ and Tex.) 
E. Equal Protection, Local Government Regulations, and 
Community Institutions for the Mentally 
Handicapped-Evaluating Contemporary Doctrine 
F. Equal Protection and "Exclusionary Zoning"-
Doctrine, Theory, and Evaluation (of federal and state 
doctrines) 
Previous Topics 
Previous topics that were employed successfully have included 
Evaluating Bowers v. Hardwick, Evaluating Roe v. Wade, Evaluat-
ing Mozert v. Hawkins, Evaluating the Commercial Speech Doc-
trine, Evaluating the Flag-Burning Cases, Evaluating Free Speech 
in High Schools, and Evaluating Affirmative Action Theories. 
Some topics I have used were not successful because the topic 
appeared to invite students to write a case note rather than develop 
competing arguments (e.g., Evaluating the Japanese-American 
Internment cases), or because the inherent complexity of the doc-
trine involved too much necessary description of alternative prem-
ises and competing arguments for an eight-page paper (e.g., 
Evaluating Establishment Clause Doctrine), or because a topic 
proved to be too difficult to allow students to recognize basic com-
peting premises that they might evaluate (e.g., Evaluating the The-
ory of Constitutional Precedents). 
Note C 
Qualities of the 1991 Papers 
The A and B + papers generally demonstrated what I would 
call "theoretical depth" in one or more ways. These papers inte-
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grated several types or methods of constitutional argument in a rel-
atively accomplished or comprehensive fashion, or integrated 
conventional methods of constitutional argument with theoretical 
perspectives, or more conventionally provided thorough and imagi-
native arguments from relevant precedents on both sides of the 
issue. 
The B papers were well-organized and clearly written and they 
provided evidence of effective research and good understanding of 
the basic arguments on both sides of a well-defined premise choice. 
The C + papers tended to be well-written and provided evidence of 
much effective research and good understanding too, but typically 
these papers were poorly organized to present systematic and per-
suasive arguments or reflected a misunderstanding of this part of 
the assignment. On the whole, it is my reading of these Band C+ 
papers in comparison to my reading of B and C + bluebook exam 
answers that lets me believe that the limited research, analytic paper 
project may teach many students to think more deeply about consti-
tutional doctrine than an examination course does. 
The C papers fell into two categories. Some papers seemed 
clearly written but provided little evidence of much research beyond 
reading the opinions in a leading case or a single law review article. 
Other papers provided partial evidence of the kind provided by B 
and C + papers but were poorly written or poorly organized. In 
reading both types, one sensed that these were papers written at the 
last minute much like a final examination, and in general I would 
not claim that the C papers evidenced much good thought about 
constitutional law. 
These assessments, of course, are subjective ones and perhaps 
self-promoting as well. The best way to test these assessments 
might be similar experiments by others that attempt to develop 
some intersubjective or collective qualitative evaluations of what 
can be learned through limited research, analytic paper projects. 
